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Access This: Why Institutions of
Higher Education Must Provide




No one questions whether the ADA applies to institutions of
higher education. Title II applies to public colleges and universities,
while Title III applies to private ones. With some exceptions, colleges
and universities must make their programs and services accessible by
providing reasonable accommodations to students with disabilities.
What is significantly less clear, and thus the topic of dispute among
courts and commentators, is whether the ADA requires colleges and
universities to provide access to the Internet to students with
disabilities. Much of the dispute revolves around the meaning of the
term "place of public accommodation." Some courts have required that
a "place" be a physical structure, while others have not. This article
will argue that regardless of the ADA'S applicability to the Internet,
institutions of higher education must ensure that students with
disabilities have access to the Internet. Part of a school's obligation to
make programs or services accessible includes providing access to the
Internet to students with disabilities whenever Internet use is necessary
to complete a course's requirements, conduct research, or access
information about the school itself.
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For over fifteen years, people with disabilities have enjoyed
easier access to buildings, protection against employment
discrimination, and access to services provided by the government and
private entities operating public accommodations. People with
disabilities have had the right to demand that they not be
discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities in a multitude
of situations since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA).1 In the area of education, both public and private
institutions of higher learning have the obligation to be accessible to
and provide reasonable accommodations to students with disabilities.
Yet, the disabled community still faces significant discrimination in
one major arena: access to the Internet. "The Internet has become the
hub of business, commercial, civic, and even social interaction. In
today's world, the ADA's application to the Internet is arguably as
important and may be more important than access to parking spaces
for the disabled."2 While there are websites that are accessible to
people with all types of disabilities, many, if not most, are not. Some
courts have found that the ADA applies to the Internet, while others
have not.
This article will discuss the applicability of the ADA to
institutions of higher education and the dispute over the application of
the ADA to the Internet. Part I will review applicable disability law,
including what constitutes a disability and reasonable
accommodation. Part II will briefly discuss the importance of the
Internet in higher education.3 Part III will provide an overview of the
circumstances under which Internet websites must be made
accessible, as well as arguments for and against applying Title III of
the ADA to the Internet. In conclusion, this article will argue that, in
the absence of clear direction from the courts or the legislature, it is
the responsibility of colleges and universities to provide reasonable
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Jonathan Bick, Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 205, 207 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
3. A comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of the importance of the Internet in
general, and the impact the Internet has had on higher education in particular, is beyond
the scope of this article.
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accommodations to students with disabilities so that they may have
the same access to the Internet as do students without disabilities.
I. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS TO STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
A. Disability Law Applicable to Institutions of Higher Education:
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
In 1973, Congress enacted section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 4 For the first time, otherwise qualified people with "handicaps"
(now termed disabilities) were protected from discrimination, though
only in programs receiving federal financial assistance, because of
their disabilities. Since most institutions of higher learning receive
federal funds, section 504 prohibited public and private schools alike
from discriminating against people with disabilities. The enactment
of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 clarified that, even if only
one of the school's programs received federal funds, section 504 would
apply to the entire institution.5
Unfortunately, section 504 did not have a significant impact on
higher education until a number of years after its enactment. There
was a five-year delay in the promulgation of implementing
regulations. Additionally, there was virtually no enforcement
mechanism to ensure that schools were actually following section
504's mandate not to discriminate against otherwise qualified
individuals with disabilities.6  Finally, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 7 now known as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),8 was not passed until two years
after the enactment of section 504. The IDEA required that all
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2000)); see Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. §
794.
5. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
6. See Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education and the Future of Disability Policy,
52 ALA. L. REV. 241 (2000) [hereinafter Rothstein, Higher Education].
7. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773, repealed by Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 91-
230, as amended by Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.S §§
1400-1482 (LEXIS 2006)).
8. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, as amended by
Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1400-1482
(LEXIS 2006)).
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children with disabilities receive a free and appropriate education. 9
Because it would take years for the children who had received a free
and appropriate education to reach college level, initially there simply
were not significant numbers of otherwise qualified people with
disabilities on college campuses. 10
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the most
sweeping civil rights legislation for people with disabilities that had
ever been passed: the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA
contained five major sections,'1 two of which are pertinent to students
at institutions of higher education. Title II of the ADA-Public
Services-prohibits all state and local government entities from
discriminating against individuals based on their disabilities.
12
Specifically, Title II extends the prohibition stated in section 504 to
include government entities that do not receive federal financial
assistance. Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."'13 Therefore, Title II applies to state universities and
community colleges since they are public entities. Those institutions
will then utilize Title II to determine whether or not a student should
receive a reasonable accommodation.14
Title III of the ADA-Public Accommodations and Services
Operated by Private Entities-prohibits places of public
accommodation from discriminating against people with disabilities.
15
Title III provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."' 6 Title III
states that if a private entity affects commerce and falls into one of
twelve listed categories, then it provides public accommodations and is
9. Id.
10. Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 6, at 243.
11. The five titles of the ADA are: Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000)
("Employment"); Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000) ("Public Services"); Title III, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000) ("Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private
Entities"); Title IV, 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000) (relating to telecommunications); and Title V, 42
U.S.C. 12201-12213 (2000) ('Miscellaneous Provisions").
12. Americans with Disabilities Act Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132.
13. Id. § 12132.
14. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-.104 (2006).
15. Americans with Disabilities Act Title III, 42 U.S.C. §12182(a).
16. Id.
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covered by the ADA. Included in the list are undergraduate and
postgraduate private schools, as well as other places of education. 17
Therefore, as places of public accommodation, private institutions of
higher education must not discriminate against students with
disabilities and must ensure that those students enjoy the same goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations as
students without disabilities. Private colleges and universities have
the obligation to "make 'reasonable modifications' in their practices,
policies or procedures, or to provide 'auxiliary aids and services' for
persons with disabilities, unless such modifications would either
'fundamentally alter' the nature of the goods, services, facilities or
other benefits offered or would result in an 'undue burden."'" 8
The passage of the ADA did not significantly change the
protections afforded to students with disabilities in higher education.
What did change by 1990, however, was the public's awareness of
disability discrimination. Students and their parents had fifteen
years in which to learn how to receive free and appropriate education.
As more students with disabilities received services over the years,
more students became qualified to attend colleges and universities. 19
In recent years, it has been estimated that one out of eleven college
freshmen self-identifies as having a disability-triple the number
reported in 1978.20 This change necessitated that colleges and
universities provide reasonable accommodations to a greatly increased
number of qualified individuals with disabilities.
B. Definition of an Individual with a Disability
1. Definition of "Disability"
The ADA provides three ways in which an individual can meet
the definition of "disability." A disability, as defined in the ADA, is
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."21  Physical disabilities include blindness, deafness,
17. Id. § 12181(7)(J).
18. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
19. Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 6, at 243.
20. Id. at 123; see More College Freshman Report Disabilities, New ACE Study
Shows, HIGHER EDUC. & NAT'L AFF. (Am. Council on Educ., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 17,
2000, at 2.
21. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
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paraplegia, and quadriplegia, among others.22 "Mental impairments"
found among the student population in institutions of higher
education frequently include some type of learning disability.
23
Dyslexia, which causes difficulty with reading, is the most common
cognitive impairment reported by students in higher education,
though they report other disorders as well, such as dyscalculia
(difficulty with math), dysgraphia (difficulty with writing), Attention
Deficit Disorder (ADD), and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD).24  Major life activities include "caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. ' 25 Courts have expanded that list to
include activities such as reproduction 26 and reading.
27
One of the issues facing students with disabilities in higher
education is the shift from being covered under the IDEA to being
covered under the ADA. The IDEA requires states wishing to receive
federal funding for special education to provide a free and appropriate
education to all students with disabilities. 28 Additionally, the local
educational agency has the responsibility to identify students who are
eligible for such services. 29 In sharp contrast, the ADA, which has
nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation provisions, contains
none of the affirmative actions required of secondary schools to
provide specialized services and individualized education plans to
students with disabilities. 30 Eligible students in secondary schools are
identified by the school system and receive a wide variety of services,
including evaluations to determine the extent of their disabilities,
physical therapy, and tutoring, for free.31 Unlike the IDEA, the ADA
22. See Sande L. Buhai, Practice Makes Perfect: Reasonable Accommodation of Law
Students with Disabilities in Clinical Placements, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 154 (1999)
("Physical disabilities include mobility impairments, hearing impairments, speech
impairments and visual impairments.").
23. Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 6.
24. Suzanne Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education: A
Practical Guide to ADA Requirements, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 217, 223 (2003); see also Buhai,
supra note 22, at 155.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 104.30j)(2)(ii) (2006).
26. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 625 (1998).
27. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 93 Civ. 4986 (SS), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11926, at *140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001).
28. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C.S. §
1412(a) (LEXIS 2006).
29. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see also Laura Rothstein, Disability Law and Higher
Education: A Road Map for Where We've Been and Where We May Be Heading, 63 MD. L.
REV. 122, 130 (2004) [hereinafter Rothstein, Disability Law].
30. Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 6, at 130-31.
31. Id.
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and section 504 place the obligation on post-secondary students to
inform institutions of higher education of the existence of their
disabilities. The students have the responsibility to document their
disabilities, pay for any necessary evaluations, and request
accommodations. 32 After years of having professionals manage all
their educational needs, the shift to doing it themselves can present
students with a difficult challenge.
Students who succeed in establishing that they have a physical
or mental impairment must then show that the impairment
substantially limits them in a major life activity. As was noted
earlier, "major life activities" include "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working."33 While neither the ADA nor section 504 defines the
term "substantially limits," 34 the preamble to the implementing
regulations states: "A person is considered an individual with a
disability . . . when the individual's important life activities are
restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they
can be performed in comparison to most people."
3 5
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases commonly
referred to as the Sutton trilogy.36 The Court held that the use of
mitigating measures, such as eyeglasses or blood pressure medication,
must be considered when determining if an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity.37 However, an individual's use of
mitigating measures does not determine whether or not that
individual has a disability.38  Rather, the appropriate test to
determine if an individual is disabled is "whether the limitations an
individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially
limiting."39 Courts post-Sutton "have concluded that a court should
only take into account mitigating measures or corrective devices that
32. Id. at 130-31, 137.
33. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3()(2)(ii) (2006).
34. See infra Part I.B.2.
35. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (2006); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
36. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
37. See Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520; Sutton, 527
U.S. at 482.
38. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
39. Id.
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affect the individual's ability to perform the major life activity the
plaintiff alleges is substantially limited by his or her impairment."
40
2. What Constitutes a "Substantial Limitation"?
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 41
the Supreme Court focused on the meaning of the term "substantially
limits." Stating that simply having an impairment does not meet the
definition of disability under the ADA, the Court addressed the issue
of what a plaintiff must show to establish that she is substantially
limited in the major life activity of performing a manual task.
42
Specifically, the Court considered whether an employee of an
automobile manufacturing plant who had carpal tunnel syndrome had
a disability within the meaning of the ADA because she was
substantially limited in performing a particular set of manual tasks.
43
Her eligibility for accommodation under the ADA depended on her
having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity,
which her employer claimed she did not have.
44
Examining the plain meaning of the term, the Court stated
that:
"Substantially" in the phrase "substantially limits" suggests "considerable" or "to a
large degree." The word "substantial" thus clearly precludes impairments that
interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from
qualifying as disabilities.
"Major" in the phrase "major life activities" means important. 'Major life
activities" thus refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily
life. 4 5
In sum, the Court held that "to be substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's
impact must also be permanent or long-term. '46  The Court
emphasized that "these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create
40. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 93 Civ. 4986 (SS), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11926, at *101 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001).
41. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
42. See id. at 195-96.
43. Id. at 187-88.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 196-97 (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 198 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)).
2008]
372 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:2:363
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled."47 It also stressed
the importance of making an individualized assessment as to whether
or not an individual's impairment constituted a disability, particularly
when the severity of the impairment, such as carpal tunnel syndrome,
could vary greatly among different people. 48 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that, because the worker in Toyota was still able to do a
variety of manual tasks despite some limitations, her impairment was
not so limiting as to constitute a disability as a matter of law. It
therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' grant of partial summary
judgment finding that the worker was substantially limited in
performing manual tasks.
49
C. What Constitutes a Reasonable Accommodation for a Student with a
Disability?
1. Who is a "Qualified" Individual with a Disability?
Once individuals have shown a disability within the meaning of
the ADA, they must show that they are otherwise qualified
individuals before they may request an accommodation under Title II
or section 504. In order to be qualified, an individual with a disability
must meet the eligibility requirements for admission to, or
participation in, programs provided by a public entity. The
individuals are still qualified even if the public entity provides them
with special assistance that enables them to meet the requirements.
Special assistance may take the form of physically modifying a public
entity's location or providing an auxiliary aid, such as a note taker, an
interpreter, or Braille materials. 50
Title II expands on section 504's definition of an "otherwise
qualified individual" by including as a qualified individual someone
who can meet the eligibility requirements, with or without reasonable
47. Id. at 197 (noting that this interpretation is confirmed by the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000)).
48. Id. at 199.
49. Id. at 202.
50. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title H, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)
(2000). A "qualified individual with as disability" is defined as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.
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accommodation. 51  State colleges and universities are considered
public entities, as noted above.52 Most individuals attending private
colleges and universities would also have to meet the "otherwise
qualified" requirement of section 504. 53 Theoretically, such students
would only have to show they were individuals with disabilities (as
opposed to qualified individuals with disabilities) under the ADA,
since Title III does not include the "qualified" requirement, as does
Title 11. 54 However, since most disability plaintiffs in higher education
cases would likely bring claims under both section 504 and the ADA,
the distinction between Titles II and III likely would not be a
significant one.
2. The Evolution of Reasonable Accommodations
When addressing the issue of who is an "otherwise qualified"
individual with a disability under section 504, courts initially held
that an individual must meet the requirements of a given program "in
spite of' any disability. 55 The Supreme Court held in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis that a school had no obligation to alter
fundamentally its programs to accommodate a hard-of-hearing
nursing school applicant. 56 After the decision in Davis, lower courts
only looked for a rational basis for institutions' decisions that
individuals with disabilities were not otherwise qualified, and no
demand was made on those institutions to accommodate individuals
with disabilities by making changes to their programs.57  The
Supreme Court clarified its position regarding accommodations in
Alexander v. Choate, stating that, to ensure access to a program or
benefit, "reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or
benefit may have to be made."5 8 However, the Court made clear that,
while an educational institution may be required to make reasonable
accommodations, it need not make fundamental or substantial
modifications to its standards or programs.
59
51. See Buhai, supra note 22, at 151.
52. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(J) (2000).
53. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
54. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, with
Americans with Disabilities Act Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
55. See Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
56. Id. at 410.
57. See Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
1991), for a discussion of lower courts' decisions after Davis.
58. 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
59. Id. at 300 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 410, 412-13).
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In School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, an
elementary school teacher brought suit claiming disability
discrimination under section 504 when she was fired for having
tuberculosis. 60 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision to remand the case because the trial court failed to
investigate either how contagious her disease was or the feasibility of
providing reasonable accommodations to her.61 Stressing the need for
an individualized inquiry and findings of fact, the Court stated that
judges give deference to the medical judgments of relevant public
health officials. 62 Ultimately, the Court cited a Third Circuit decision
that enunciated the standard for "reasonable accommodation." 63 The
Third Circuit had clearly stated that an individual with a disability
"who cannot meet all of a program's requirements is not otherwise
qualified if there is a factual basis in the record reasonably
demonstrating that accommodating that individual would require
either a modification of the essential nature of the program, or impose
an undue burden."
64
A First Circuit decision specified exactly what test should be
applied when determining whether an academic institution has met
its burden of exploring reasonable accommodations for students with
disabilities. In Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, a
medical student with dyslexia claimed discrimination under section
504 when the school failed to accommodate his reading impairment by
modifying its multiple-choice exams. 65 Acknowledging that Wynne
would have a difficult time proving he was an "otherwise qualified"
individual with a disability, the court nonetheless set aside the lower
court's granting of Tufts's summary judgment motion because the
school failed to investigate reasonable alternatives to multiple choice
exams, did not explain the importance of that particular type of exam,
and did not even indicate who participated in the decision on whether
to accommodate Wynne.
66
The First Circuit court formulated an approach to determine if
an academic institution has adequately explored the availability of
reasonable accommodations for an individual with a disability:
60. 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
61. Id. at 288-89.
62. Id. at 287-88.
63. Id. at 288 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 410-13; Alexander, 469 U.S. at
299-301).
64. Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983).
65. 932 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1991).
66. Id. at 28.
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If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant
officials within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost
and effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion
that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards
or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law
that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.
6 7
On remand, the lower court held that Tufts had met its burden
under the above-stated approach, and granted the university's
summary judgment motion. 68 Wynne appealed, and the circuit court
affirmed the lower court's decision. 69  Tufts had successfully
demonstrated why it could not change its format to accommodate
Wynne, concluding that "no further accommodation could be made
without imposing an undue (and injurious) hardship on the academic
program." 70
Private entities must also accommodate people with
disabilities. They must "make reasonable modifications in [their]
policies, practices, or procedures," or provide "auxiliary aids and
services" for persons with disabilities, unless "such modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of [the] goods, services,
facilities" or other benefits offered, or "would result in an undue
burden."71 As discussed above, private schools not covered by Title II
would be covered by Title 111.72 Private colleges and universities have
the same obligation as public ones do to provide reasonable
accommodations to students with disabilities, with the same caveat:
the accommodations must be provided unless they constitute either a
fundamental alteration of the programs offered or an undue burden on
the institution.73 In Mershon v. St. Louis University, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of the defendant-
university's motion for summary judgment. 74 The appellate court
found that the University did not fail to provide reasonable
accommodations to a student who was wheelchair-bound and sight-
impaired due to complications from cerebral palsy.
75
In reaching its decision, the Mershon court stated that
discrimination under Title III of the ADA specifically includes failing
67. Id. at 26.
68. See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 796.
70. Id. at 795.
71. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
72. Id. § 12182(a).
73. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
74. 442 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006).
75. Id. at 1077.
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to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
to accommodate disabled individuals, unless such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the services. 76 Under section 504, a
university must provide reasonable accommodations to otherwise
qualified disabled students who would not otherwise have meaningful
access to a university. 77 While Title III does not specifically refer to an
"otherwise qualified" standard, since qualifications generally are not
required to enjoy a public accommodation, the standard does become
relevant in situations involving post-secondary education.
78
Noting that Title III does not require modifications of programs
if in so doing the programs would be fundamentally altered, the
Mershon court stated:
It is beyond question that it would fundamentally alter the nature of a graduate
program to require the admission of a disabled student who cannot, with
reasonable accommodations, otherwise meet the academic standards of the
program. An educational institution is not required by the Rehabilitation Act or
the ADA to lower its academic standards for a professional degree.
7 9
In the context of higher education, the court concluded that an
individual with a disability alleging a failure to accommodate under
both section 504 and the ADA must show:
(1) that the plaintiff is disabled and otherwise qualified academically, (2) that the
defendant is a private entity that owns, leases or operates a place of public
accommodation, for ADA purposes, or receives federal funding, for Rehabilitation
Act purposes, and (3) that the defendant failed to make reasonable modifications
that would accommodate the plaintiffs disability without fundamentally altering
the nature of the public accommodation.
8 0
Students have several hurdles they must overcome before they
can allege that they are entitled to reasonable accommodations from a
private or public college or university. First, students must meet the
definition of disability. Second, students must show that they are
academically qualified to attend the institution. Third, they must
show that the institution is covered either by the ADA, section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, or both. And finally, students must show that
the institution could have accommodated their disability without
fundamentally altering the nature of the school's program or service.
Once students have successfully completed all of these steps, they are
entitled to receive reasonable accommodations from the college or
76. Id. at 1076.
77. See id. at 1076-77.
78. Id. at 1076 (noting that "the 'otherwise qualified' idea is implicit in Title III's
acknowledgement . . . that requested modifications need not be provided if they will
fundamentally alter the nature of the program").
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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university enabling them to participate in the school's programs and
services.
3. Examples of Reasonable Accommodations and Limitations on
Accommodations
Students in institutions of higher education who successfully
meet the definition of disability are entitled to receive reasonable
accommodations. Accommodations commonly provided to students
with disabilities include extra time on exams and assignments,
separate rooms for exams, waiver of courses, reduced course loads,
interpreters, and readers.81
In the area of higher education, the Department of Education's
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is the agency responsible for enforcing the
ADA.8 2 To determine if a school discriminated against a student with
a disability, the OCR will closely examine procedural issues,
particularly if the school had a policy in place to address the needs of
students with disabilities.8 3 In examining the facts of a particular
case, courts will often utilize the OCR's approach when deciding if the
school acted appropriately on the issue of reasonable
accommodations.8 4  The case of Guckenberger v. Boston University
demonstrates how one court did S0.85
In Guckenberger, a group of students with various disabilities
(notably ADD, ADHD, and other learning disabilities) brought suit
against Boston University for discriminating against them based on
their disabilities.8 6 One disputed issue involved a change in the
University's policy on providing accommodations.8 7 After minimal
investigation and without consulting any experts on learning
disabilities, the University's president, with no background in the
disability field or expertise in developing accommodations,
unilaterally abolished the University's practice of allowing students
with learning disabilities to substitute other courses in place of foreign
language and math requirements.88 The University also instituted
new standards requiring learning-disabled students, when requesting
accommodations, to provide documentation of any disabilities that had
81. See Rothstein, Higher Education, supra note 6, at 255.
82. 49 C.F.R. § 1.70(g) (2006).
83. See Buhai, supra note 22, at 164.
84. Id. at 165.
85. 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997).
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id. at 115.
88. Id. at 117-18.
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been diagnosed within the last three years.8 9  Additionally, the
University required that the professionals providing the
documentation have a doctorate in psychology or be a licensed
physician. 90
Reviewing the University's policies, the appellate court ordered
the University to stop implementing its rule requiring students with
learning disabilities who had current evaluations by trained
professionals to be retested by professionals with medical degrees,
doctorate degrees, or licensed clinical psychologists in order to be
eligible to receive reasonable accommodations. The court excluded
those students with ADD or ADHD from the order, finding that the
University did prove that a doctorate is necessary to evaluate those
conditions.91 The court also stated that the University's refusal to
make any course substitutions for, math or foreign language
requirements could have been acceptable had the University followed
the procedural guidelines established in Wynne. 92  However, the
University neither conducted a reasonable assessment of the viable
options nor concluded that accommodations could not be provided
based on professional judgment. 93 The University failed to show,
through a deliberative process, that a change in the course
requirements would fundamentally alter the essential standards of its
curriculum. 94 Therefore, the court declined to extend deference to the
University's decision.95
In other cases, however, courts have given great deference to
decisions made by institutions of higher learning, particularly when
deciding what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. For example,
in Amir v. St. Louis University, a medical student with obsessive
compulsive disorder requested three different accommodations, none
of which the Eighth Circuit determined was reasonable.96 After
struggling academically, Amir filed a complaint alleging, among other
things, that St. Louis University failed to accommodate reasonably his
disability.97  He had made several requests of the University,
including that he be allowed to complete his psychiatry clerkship at a
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. at 120-21.
91. Id. at 139-40, 154.
92. Id. at 148-49 (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med, 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st
Cir. 1992); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1991)).
93. See id. at 117-18, 130, 149.
94. Id, at 149.
95. Id.
96. 184 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1024.
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different institution and that he be assigned a passing grade in
psychiatry after receiving a failing one. 98 The school had a policy that
did not allow students experiencing academic difficulties to take
classes at other universities. 9 The court determined that this policy
was not unreasonable, and that Amir's requests did not constitute
reasonable accommodations. 100  The Eighth Circuit expressed its
reluctance to interfere in the University's decision, stating that the
policy did not appear "discriminatory or unreasonable," and therefore,
it declined to "second guess [the University]'s academic policy."' 01
In Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine, the
plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with a learning disability, though
not before being dismissed from the school for failing two courses.
10 2
After being reinstated, Kaltenberger received nine of her eleven
requested accommodations, including extra time on exams, but still
failed a course for the second time.10 3 Kaltenberger acknowledged
that allowing her to retake the exam for the course she failed twice
would violate the College's standard policy, but she argued that the
College had been involved in delaying her diagnosis and, therefore,
owed her greater accommodations. 0 4  The court rejected
Kaltenberger's argument, agreeing with the district court's finding
that the College in no way failed to reasonably accommodate her
disability. 105 Specifically, the court expressed its reluctance to
intervene in academic decisions.10 6 It held that the College's refusal to
waive its standard policy regarding the retaking of exams did not
constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommodations for
Kaltenberger's disability, particularly given the accommodations
already provided to her.107
98. Id. at 1028.
99. Id. at 1029.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 162 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir. 1998).
103. Id. at 436. Following her request for accommodations, Kaltenberger was "placed
in a five-year program (which had a lighter course load during the first two years)," and
was provided with "individualized tutoring in each class," "a place to sit in the front of the
class," "permission to tape lectures," "extra time on tests," and "the opportunity to take the
tests in a separate room from other students." Id. at 434-35. However, she was not
permitted to retake biochemistry during the summer session (an abbreviated, remedial
course with individualized instruction) and was not permitted to retake the biology exam
after failing the course for the second time. Id. at 435.
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On a summary judgment motion brought by the University of
Massachusetts at Boston in Darian v. University of Massachusetts
Boston, the University argued that it had reasonably accommodated a
nursing student suffering from serious complications resulting from a
difficult pregnancy. 03 The student, Rachel Darian, was enrolled in a
clinical course required for the completion of her nursing degree. 10 9
The University had accommodated Darian by allowing her to take files
home, to see only one patient per clinical day, to make up missed
clinical time, to refrain from climbing stairs, and to observe, while
sitting, how someone scheduled home health care visits.110 The
University also offered Darian an "incomplete" in the clinical portion
of the course and a chance to graduate on schedule.' However,
Darian turned down this offer, missed clinical days because she was
allegedly reviewing patient charts at home, and was not permitted to
withdraw administratively from the clinical course. 112 In addition to
missing clinical days, Darian did not take the final exam, did not hand
in her final paper, and did not participate in the group project; she
subsequently received an "F" in the course.
113
After finding that Darian's complications did constitute a
disability under the ADA, the court next considered whether the
University excluded Darian from participation in a program because
of her disability and if it made sufficient efforts to accommodate
reasonably her disability." 4  The court relied on Arline for the
proposition that reasonable accommodations are not required under
all circumstances, particularly when they would constitute an undue
burden or if they would fundamentally alter the nature of the
program." 5 The court also applied the factors set forth in Wynne to
reach the conclusion that the University did reasonably accommodate
Darian." 6 The court held that any further accommodations "would
have lowered its academic standards or substantially altered its
academic requirements," and ruled as a matter of law that the
108. 980 F. Supp. 77, 87-88 (D. Mass. 1997).
109. Id. at 80.
110. Id. at 81, 82.
111. Id. at 83.
112. Id. at 82-84.
113. Id. at 84.
114. Id. at 87-88.
115. Id. at 88 (citing School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
116. Id. at 90-91 (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med, 976 F.2d 791, 793, 795
(1st Cir. 1992); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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The ADA defines discrimination to include
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations. 118
A university can successfully defend itself against a student's claim
that it failed to accommodate reasonably that student's request for
modifications by showing that the modifications allowing the student
access to its programs or services would fundamentally alter the
nature of those programs or services. 119 For example, if a particular
educational program included a key visual or auditory component
(e.g., examining the use of color in an art appreciation class or
identifying certain symptoms by sound in a medical school class),
without which the program could not be presented, any modification
to those components would most likely fundamentally alter that
program and the university would not be compelled to make the
requested changes. 120
The Supreme Court, in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, asserted that "[s]ection 504 imposes no requirement upon an
educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications
of standards to accommodate a handicapped person." 121 In Zukle v.
Regents of the University of California, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
lower court's decision that the learning-disabled plaintiffs requests for
accommodation were not reasonable.1 22 The court based its decision
on a finding that Zukle's requested accommodations would result in a
117. Id. at 88; see id. at 91.
118. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)
(2000).
119. For an example, see discussion of Darian v. University of Massachusetts Boston,
980 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1997), supra notes 108-17.
120. For further discussion of the fundamental alteration defense in general, see
PETER BLANcK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY § 13.6(E) (2004).
121. 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979).
122. 166 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999).
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substantial alteration to the medical school's program. 123 And, in
Guckenberger v. Boston University, the district court noted that
neither section 504 nor the ADA "require a university to provide
course substitutions that the university rationally concludes would
alter an essential part of its academic program."'124
2. Undue Burden
While the reasonable modification requirement in Title II does
not explicitly include an undue hardship or burden defense, courts
have incorporated that defense into the fundamental alteration
defense. 25  When determining whether a modification would
constitute a fundamental alteration, courts will consider whether that
modification would create an undue burden-either financial or
administrative-on the entity in question. 126 An "undue burden" is a
modification that is significantly costly or difficult. 127 Factors used to
determine when an action would be readily achievable, which by
definition is the opposite of an undue burden, include:
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed... ;
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the
number of persons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources... ;
(3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of
the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity;
(4) If applicable, the overall financial resources or any parent corporation or entity;
the overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent corporation or
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the
parent corporation or entity. 128
As noted above, in Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, Tufts
was able to justify its decision not to provide accommodations to
Wynne because to do so would overly burden the academic program. 129
123. Id.
124. 974 F. Supp. 106, 149 (D. Mass. 1997). As discussed above, however, because
the University had no basis for claiming that course substitutions for certain requirements
would fundamentally alter its curriculum, its use of the fundamental alteration defense
failed. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
125. See BLANCK ET AL., supra note 120, at § 11.4(A).
126. Id.
127. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007); see also Buhai, supra note 22, at 153 n.87.
128. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
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In summary, the current state of the law requires that before
disabled students can receive accommodations to participate fully in
educational programs and services, students in colleges or universities
must first overcome the hurdle of proving that they are disabled.
Next, they must show that they are otherwise qualified to participate
in an educational program so that they may receive reasonable
accommodations for their disability from the college or university.
The institution of higher learning must then provide reasonable
accommodations to those students so long as the accommodations do
not fundamentally alter the educational program or service.
Examples of common accommodations include providing an
interpreter so that a deaf student can understand a professor's lecture
or translating a textbook into Braille so that a blind student can read
the assigned material. The appropriate accommodation for less
traditional modes of instruction, such as those incorporating use of the
Internet into the course's curriculum, do not necessarily have to be
any more complicated. While there are significant differences of
opinion surrounding the applicability of the ADA to the Internet, no
such dispute surrounds whether a college or university must provide
reasonable accommodations to its students with disabilities. Equally
clear should be an institution of higher learning's obligation to make
the Internet accessible to its students with disabilities.
II. THE PREVALENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
A. Internet Use on College Campuses and its Impact on Students with
Disabilities
Developed as a research tool for universities in the 1970s and
1980s, the widespread use of the Internet began around the time that
the ADA was signed into law. 130 By the end of the 1990s, one
researcher stated, "Use of the Internet as a teaching aid is literally
exploding."'13' Another noted the many ways in which the Internet
129. 976 F.2d 791, 975 (1st Cir. 1992). See Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring, 527
U.S. 581, 597, 603-04 (1999), in which the Supreme Court included discussion of a cost-
based defense in its fundamental alteration analysis of whether a state had to place certain
individuals with mental disabilities in a community-based, rather than institutional,
setting.
130. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 9-35 (2001).
131. Jerome Young, Computers and Teaching: Evolution of a Cyberclass, 31 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 568, 568 (1998).
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could be used in the educational setting, such as placing course
materials online, encouraging students to conduct research, and
communicating with students via e-mail. 132 A study conducted in
2004 showed a 45 percent increase in Internet use by teens since 2000,
with 87 percent of all twelve- to seventeen-year-olds using the
Internet, and 78 percent of them specifically using the Internet at
school. 133 Students are arriving at colleges well versed in, or at the
very least familiar with, using a computer, and most grew up with the
Internet, a technology as ordinary to them as a television or radio.134
Once in college, students rely heavily on the Internet for both
personal and educational purposes. Of particular note is the impact
the Internet has had on students' use of libraries. University libraries
tracked by the Association of Research Libraries reported a significant
decline in reference queries since the 1990s, which coincides with the
growth and widespread use of the Internet as a research tool. 35 A
separate study showed that an overwhelming number of college
students-73 percent-used the Internet more than the library, with
many students using search engines and various websites to locate
research material. 136 When predicting the implications of college
students' use of the Internet, the same study suggested that they will
continue to use the Internet as a primary information resource in the
future, having greater trust in it than previous generations. "In short,
the Web has become an information cornerstone for [college
students]."'37
Professors are also using the Internet extensively. Results
from a 2004 survey investigating the Internet's impact on college
faculty indicated that almost two-thirds of the respondents used the
Internet from four to nineteen hours per week. 138  The report
summarizing the survey's results indicated:
132. Walter S. Baer, Will the Internet Transform Higher Education?, in THE
EMERGING INTERNET: ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION STUDIES
(1998), reprinted at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP685/ RP685.pdf.
133. Memorandum from Paul Hitlin, Research Assistant, & Lee Rainie, Director,
Pew Internet & American Life Project on Teens, Technology, and School (Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP Internet-andschools-O5.pdf.
134. Steve Jones, The Internet Goes to College: How Students are Living in the
Future with Today's Technology, at 2 (Sept. 15 2002), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPCollegeReport.pdf.
135. See id. at 12.
136. Id. at 12-13.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Steve Jones & Camille Johnson-Yale, Professors Online: The Internet's Impact
on College Faculty, 10 FIRST MONDAY (2005), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issuelO_9/
jones/.
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More students are likely to encounter technology in all facets of their college
educations (indeed, it is in some ways virtually unavoidable already), and many of
our respondents think that institutions will need to be prepared to assist students
as they encounter new technologies and to help faculty learn how to determine
which technologies to use.
1 3 9
One indication of the availability of new technologies is the seemingly
never-ending stream of products available for college faculty members'
use. So many products have been developed for college instructors'
online use that "a cottage industry, made up of software developers,
academic technologists, and instructors, has sprung up to help faculty
members put their courses on line without having to learn intricate
page-coding schemes.' 4 °
However, some of the products may not be usable by students
with certain disabilities. For example, CourseInfo allows professors to
create course websites just by filling in forms on a web page, and
enables professors to customize their web pages by "manipulating
color schemes and buttons."14' They also may "place images and audio
files on their pages."' 42  The color schemes and images could pose
problems for students with seizure disorders and vision problems,
while the audio files would be inaccessible to deaf students unless they
were close captioned.
Another issue that arises when professors use web pages and
require online research as part of their courses is the speed with
which technology changes. While it makes sense that improving a
technology product would include incorporating changes to make it
accessible to all, unfortunately, this is not the case. "With Internet
technology, newer does not mean more accessible. Web designers
often ignore access, even when it's easy to provide."' 43 As professors
strive to update their use of the Internet and online tools, they may be
excluding students with disabilities from receiving and fully enjoying
the benefits of the educational programs offered by colleges and
universities.
Undeniably, the Internet has become an integral part of getting
a college education. Whether they post their class material online,
communicate with students via e-mail, or require students to conduct
research online, professors are integrating the use of the Internet into
139. Id.
140. Kelly McCollum, Colleges Sort Through Vast Store of Tools for Designing Web




143. Art Blaser, Distance Learning-Boon or Bane?, 5 RAGGED EDGE ON LINE (Sept.
2001), http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0901/0901ft1.htm.
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their classes. Several authors on the subject have highlighted how a
limited ability to access the Internet has placed students with
disabilities in a difficult position academically: "The Web is a
fundamental tool in post-secondary education," and students whose
disabilities prevent them from using this tool "are limited in their
ability to gather basic course information, conduct research,
participate in assignments, and participate in the social community of
others."144 As a whole, people with disabilities are less likely to use
the Internet because their disabilities make that use either difficult or
impossible. Websites may be inaccessible to them for a range of
reasons, from incompatibility with screen-readers to the prohibitive
price of adaptive hardware. 145 Without access to the same websites
that their classmates have, students with certain disabilities are at a
distinct disadvantage to their peers.
B. Instructional Materials are Covered by the ADA
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits institutions
receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating against
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities.1 46 Title II of the
ADA, which applies to public colleges and universities, requires that
no qualified person with a disability be excluded from participating in
programs or activities of a public entity, or be denied the benefits of
the public entity's services.1 47 Title III of the ADA, which applies to
private colleges and universities, prohibits owners of public
accommodations from discriminating against people with disabilities
in the full and equal enjoyment of services provided by the
accommodations. 48
State colleges and universities must comply with Title II of the
ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore, must
make their programs, services, and activities accessible to people with
disabilities. In order to do so, state institutions of higher learning
144. Jim Byrne, Are Disabled Students Set to Lose Out?, (Jan. 20, 2005),
http://www.mcu.org.uklarticles/disabledstudents.html (citing Cyndi Rowland, Accessibility
of the Internet in Postsecondary Education: Meeting the Challenge, http://www.webaim.org/
rticles/meetchallenge (last visited Nov. 19, 2007)).
145. Amanda Lenhart, The Ever Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
Internet Access and the Digital Divide, at 32 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPShifting-Net_- PopReport.pdf.
146. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
147. See supra Part L.A (discussing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title II,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000)).
148. See supra Part L.A (discussing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000)).
ACCESS THIS
must ensure that all students with disabilities have access to the same
school-provided technology as the rest of the student population. If a
school offers information about the institution and its programs on a
website, that website must be accessible. If a professor operates a
website for a class, that website must be accessible. Class materials
provided to students via the Internet constitute one aspect of a
program or service being provided by the college or university to the
students. Requirements that students conduct online research make
up another part of a college or university's program or service. To
avoid discriminating against students with disabilities in classes with
Internet components and requirements, colleges and universities must
ensure that the materials and relevant websites are accessible to all
students.
III. INTERNET PROVIDERS/WEBSITES ARE NOT GENERALLY REQUIRED
TO BE ACCESSIBLE TO PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
A. Applicability of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to the Internet
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities who
participate in an entity's program, service, or activity, and section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal funds from
discriminating against those same individuals. 149 However, at the
time these laws were passed, technology and the Internet simply did
not exist in their present forms, so neither statute specifically
mentions access to websites, online resources, and other types of
electronic and information technology. 150  In 1996, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued an opinion letter that stated:
Covered entities under the ADA are required to provide effective communication,
regardless of whether they generally communicate through print media, audio
media, or computerized media such as the Internet. Covered entities that use the
Internet for communications regarding their programs, goods, or services must be
prepared to offer those communications through accessible means as well.
151
149. See Americans with Disabilities Act Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Rehabilitation
Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
150. See Edward L. Myers III, Disability and Technology, 65 MONT. L. REV. 289,
297-98 (2004).
151. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to the
Honorable Tom Harkin, U.S. Senator (Sept. 9, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
oia/cltr204.txt.
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Since issuing this letter, the DOJ has shifted its focus to website
accessibility. In 2003, the DOJ issued suggestions pertaining to how
state and local governments can make their websites accessible and
compliant with the ADA.
152
According to the OCR, three components determine the
"effective communication" referred to in the DOJ opinion letter: the
timeliness of the delivery, the website translation's accuracy, and the
manner in which it is communicated, which should correspond to the
abilities of the individual with a disability. 153 The OCR also provides
a preemptive response to a school that attempts to use an undue
burden argument to defend against making its software or hardware
accessible. 154 Specifically, the OCR points out that the school could
have addressed the accessibility issue when it initially acquired the
equipment.' 5 5 If the school could have acquired accessible software or
hardware when it first made the equipment purchase, it cannot later
argue that the cost of making the equipment accessible would be an
undue burden. 
1 56
One case that addressed the applicability of Title II and section
504 to information technology involved the accessibility of a mass
transit system. In Martin v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority, several plaintiffs with disabilities brought a lawsuit
alleging that Atlanta's mass transit system (MARTA) discriminated
against them on the basis of their disabilities. 57 In addition to
MARTA's schedule and route information not being regularly
available to passengers with disabilities, its website was not formatted
in plain text format. This precluded blind passengers from using text
reader software to access the website's information. 58 While the
general public could easily access MARTA's schedule and route
information simply by going to any MARTA station, passengers with
visual disabilities could not.159 Instead, their options were to call for
information and be put on hold for long periods of time; to receive
information in Braille (but only if they specified the exact date and
152. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, DISABILITY RIGHTS
SECTION, ACCESSIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WEBSITES TO PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/websites2-scrn.pdf.
153. Myers, supra note 150, at 298.
154. Id. at 299.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
158. Id. at 1366.
159. Id. Passengers with mobility impairments also experienced significant
accessibility problems, particularly with wheelchair lifts, but their access issues did not
involve information technology. Id. at 1366-67.
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time they wished to travel); or to receive occasionally available
information packets in Braille that contained no route or schedule
information. 160
The district court determined that, by not making route and
schedule information as available to passengers with disabilities as it
was to the general public, MARTA violated the ADA mandate of
"'making adequate communications capacity available, through
accessible formats and technology, to enable users to obtain
information and schedule service."' 161  Granting the requested
preliminary injunction, the court ordered MARTA to continue its
efforts to make its website accessible and to provide information to
passengers with disabilities in an equal and timelier manner.
162
B. Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998
In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Workforce
Investment Act. 163 This Act amended and strengthened section 508 of
the Rehabilitation Act by mandating that all federal agencies make
their electronic and information technology accessible to all federal
employees, both with and without disabilities. 6 4 The amended section
508 also required that members of the public with disabilities have the
same access to information and services from federal agencies as those
without disabilities. 165 Unlike section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,166 section 508 does not apply to all recipients of federal funds
and does not directly regulate the private sector. 167 More narrowly, it
applies in a limited fashion to states receiving federal funds under the
Assistive Technology Act of 1998,168 which repealed the Technology
Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1988.169
Today, the Assistive Technology Act addresses the prevalence
of digital access issues and the dearth of resources available at the
160. Id. at 1365.
161. Id. at 1377 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(f) (2006)).
162. Id.
163. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2000)).
164. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 508, 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2000).
165. Id. § 794d(a)(1)(A).
166. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 794d.
168. Assistive Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-394, 112 Stat. 3627 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
169. Technology Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-407, 102 Stat. 1044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
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state level to address those issues. 170 It provides financial assistance
"to support State efforts to improve the provision of assistive
technology to individuals with disabilities through comprehensive
statewide programs of technology-related assistance, for individuals
with disabilities of all ages." 171 Congress clarified the applicability of
section 508 to the states when it reauthorized and amended the
Assistive Technology Act in 2004.172 Now, when a state applies for
funding under the Assistive Technology Act, the application must
provide assurances that "activities carried out in the State that are
authorized under this chapter, and supported by Federal funds
received under this chapter, will comply with the standards
established" under section 508.173
In addition to agreeing to comply with section 508 when
applying for Assistive Technology funds, a state would also be
required to comply with section 508 if that state chooses to adopt a
section 508-type statute. As of 2006, eighteen states had adopted
section 508-type statutes. 174  However, the level at which states
comply with section 508 may vary. While most state statutes benefit
all people with disabilities, some may only target those with visual
disabilities.1 75 In those states that have adopted section 508-type
statutes without limitation, state universities must comply with the
requirements of section 508 so that both their own websites and the
websites connected to course curriculum are accessible to all students.
170. See Assistive Technology Act of 2004, 29 U.S.C.A. § 3001(b)(1) (Westlaw 2006).
171. Id.
172. Assistive Technology Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-364 § 4(d)(6)(G), 118 Stat.
1707, 1719 (2004) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 3003(d)(6)(G) (Westlaw 2006)).
173. 29 U.S.C.A. § 3003(d)(6)(G).
174. The states that have adopted section 508-type statutes include Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3531 to -3532 (LEXIS through 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 48th Legislature); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11135 (Deering, LEXIS through
2007 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-85-101 to -104 (LEXIS through 2007 Sess.);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.601-.606 (LEXIS through 2007D Special Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39:301-:302 (LEXIS through 2007 Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.863 (LEXIS through 1st
Extra Sess. of the Reg. Sess. of the 94th Gen. Assembly); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-205
(LEXIS through 2007 1st Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 41.5t-.5t.2 (LEXIS through 1st
Sess. of the 51st Legislature); Information Technology Accessibility Act, Ill. Pub. Act No.
095-0307 (2007), available at http://www.ilga.govflegislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name
=095-0307.
175. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-85-103 (requiring the maintenance of
"nonvisual access standards for information technology systems employed by state
agencies"); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-205 (requiring that "input and output technology
shall be capable of supporting modification and otherwise provide for equivalent access for
both visual and nonvisual use").
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Congress has given authority to the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) to develop
and adopt accessibility standards for the federal government in the
area of electronic and information technology. 176 The Access Board is
required to consult various individuals and organizations before
developing its standards, which would then become part of the federal
regulations implementing section 508.177 The Secretary of Education,
the Secretary of Defense, and organizations involved with the
electronic and information technology industry, as well as those
representing individuals with disabilities, among others, are expected
to confer with the Access Board regarding the standards. 178 The
Access Board released the final standards on December 21, 2000, and
they became effective on February 20, 2001.179 Addressing more than
just websites, the standards cover "the full range of electronic and
information technologies in the Federal sector, including those used
for communication, duplication, computing, storage, presentation,
control, transport and production."18 0
Section 508 applies to federal agencies when they develop,
maintain, procure, or use electronic and information technology.
181
Electronic and information technology "includes, but is not limited to,
telecommunications products (such as telephones), information kiosks
and transaction machines, World Wide Web sites, multimedia, and
office equipment such as copiers and fax machines."'18 2 It does not
include "any equipment that contains embedded information
technology that is used as an integral part of the product, but the
principal function of which is not the acquisition, storage,
manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching,
interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information."
' 18 3
Making an Internet website accessible requires the creation of
a website that can be used by people with a variety of disabilities,
such as blindness, deafness, mobility impairments, epilepsy, and
176. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 508, 29 U.S.C. § 794d(a)(2)(A) (2000).
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 36 C.F.R. §
1194 (2006); see 65 Fed. Reg. 80,500-01 (Dec. 21, 2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794d(f)(1)(A).
180. Electronic and Information Technology Standards: An Overview,
http://www.access-board.gov/sec508/summary.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
181. 36 C.F.R. § 1194.1.
182. Id. § 1194.4.
183. Id.
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colorblindness. 8 4 One key aspect of an accessible website entails the
creation of an information technology system that does not depend
only on a single sense or ability.185 Examples of accessible websites
would include websites for which blind individuals can use screen-
reader software programs, websites that close caption video segments
for deaf individuals, and websites that do not use sudden, flashing
images that could irritate those with seizure disorders.
Federal agencies need only make their websites and other
information technology accessible to federal employees and members
of the public, both with and without disabilities, if doing so would not
constitute an "undue burden."'186 Undue burden is defined in the
federal regulations as it is in the ADA and section 504-as a
significant difficulty or expense-and all of an agency's resources must
be considered when making an undue burden determination. 187 For
example, when faced with a student with a disability's request that a
website be made accessible, a state college's budget would not be
examined to determine if doing so would constitute an undue burden.
Rather, the state's budget as a whole would be considered when
making that determination. However, even if compliance with section
508 standards would create an undue burden, a federal agency must
still provide its employees with an alternative means to access the
information and data. 88 The agency also does not have to alter a
product fundamentally in order to make it accessible.
89
The Access Board's standards exempt national security
systems, intelligence activities, and weapons systems from its
accessibility requirements. 190  Also exempted is electronic and
information technology acquired by a governmental contractor
"incidental to a contract."'19 For example, if a federal agency contracts
with an outside firm to develop the agency's website, the firm's own
website does not have to comply with the accessibility standards
applied to the federal agency.192 Only if contractors are conducting
184. See Leah Poynter, Setting the Standard: Section 508 Could Have an Impact on
Private Sector Web Sites Through the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
1197, 1199 (2003).
185. Id. (citation omitted).
186. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 508, 29 U.S.C. § 794d(a)(1)(A) (2000).
187. See 36 C.F.R. § 1194.4.
188. 29 U.S.C. § 794d(a)(1)(B).
189. 36 C.F.R. § 1194.3(e).
190. Id. § 1194.3(a).
191. Id. § 1194.3(b).
192. See id.
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activities such as developing websites or manufacturing products to
sell to the federal government must they comply with section 508.193
Section 508's goal is for the federal government to utilize
accessibility features in its mainstream technologies so that the need
for specialized accommodations will decline and to make those
accommodations that are still needed more efficient. 194  As the
Internet arguably is the most important mainstream technology used
today, the application of section 508 to Internet-related products
should be straightforward. 195  Minimally, with the government
purchasing approximately 10 percent of information technology sold in
a given year, private manufacturers of software and computer
equipment have a financial incentive to make their products
accessible.196
While section 508 does not apply to private Internet sites, the
Access Board's standards may aid courts in applying the ADA to the
Internet. Of note is the use of language in the federal regulations,
such as "undue burden," that is identical to the terminology used in
the ADA and ADA regulations, indicating a connection between
section 508 and the ADA.
C. Arguments in Favor of Title III of the ADA Applying to the Internet
The arguments both for and against the application of Title III
of the ADA to the Internet revolve around several terms found in the
Act itself, as well as some that the Act fails to mention. Questions and
debate arise when interpreting the breadth of congressional authority
to address discrimination faced by people with disabilities. More
specifically, differences in opinion emerge when defining and
interpreting terms such as "public accommodation" and "places of
public accommodation."'' 97
In enacting the ADA, Congress intended "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
193. Myers, supra note 150, at 294.
194. Bick, supra note 2, at 222.
195. See id.
196. Allen S. Hammond, Reflections on the Myth of Icarus in the Age of Information,
19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 407, 439 (2003).
197. See generally Colin Crawford, Cyberspace: Defining a Right to Internet Access
Through Public Accommodation Law, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 228 (2003) (arguing that
"public accommodation law is an appropriate legal vehicle to establish a right of Internet
access"); Matthew A. Stowe, Note, Intepreting "Place of Public Accommodation" Under Title
III of the ADA: A Technical Determination with Potentially Broad Civil Rights
Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 316-29 (2000) (arguing for broad construction of the ADA
to apply to non-location-based membership organizations).
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against individuals with disabilities," as well as "clear, strong,
consistent enforceable standards" to protect people from disability
discrimination. 198  The ADA aimed to "invoke the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to . . . regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities."199 People with disabilities had
regularly experienced discrimination in places of public
accommodation. Whether it was restaurants that did not have
wheelchair ramps or hotels that did not have TDDs
(Telecommunications Device for the Deaf) for their deaf guests, prior
to the ADA, public accommodations discriminated against people with
disabilities on a daily basis. Title III attempted to change that by
prohibiting disability discrimination in places of public
accommodation. However, at the time of the ADA's enactment, the
Internet and World Wide Web did not exist as they do today.
Therefore, the legislation does not address, nor did the legislators
likely contemplate, its applicability to these forms of
communication.
200
What the legislation does clearly enumerate are twelve
categories of "public accommodation." They include restaurants,
hotels, shopping centers, private schools, and places of recreation,
exhibition, entertainment, or exercise. 20 1 And, while the categories
198. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
199. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
200. See Kelly E. Konkright, Comment, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REV.
713, 715-16 (2001).
201. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
This section states that a private entity provides public accommodations if it affects
commerce and falls into one of the following categories:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging...
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or
other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital,
or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(1) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
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themselves are exhaustive, the examples given to illustrate each
category are not.20 2 The lengthy list of categories indicates Congress's
intent to address disability discrimination in virtually all situations in
which the public has contact with a business or entity.
20 3
The Internet is used regularly for business, commercial, civic,
and social interaction. It enables users to form "virtual communities"
that could be considered public places. "If the Internet is a new kind
of public space, one can argue that the rights of the disabled should
include meaningful Internet accommodation." 20 4 This leaves open the
possibility, and opens the debate, that the Internet and its websites
could fit into one of the twelve categories. Before that can occur,
however, the courts or legislature must resolve the issue of what
constitutes a place of public accommodation. Those in favor of
applying Title III to the Internet argue that the statutory noun "place"
is a term of convenience, not a term of limitation (in the sense of
referring only to a tangible location), when interpreting an anti-
discrimination statute. 20 5 So, for example, if a place of entertainment
could exist without being limited to a physical space, an Internet
entertainment website would therefore be included in one of the
twelve categories and be covered by the ADA.
In the first web access civil rights lawsuit, the National
Federation of the Blind (NFB) filed suit against America Online, Inc.
(AOL), the nation's largest Internet service provider at the time.20
6
NFB charged that the software necessary to use AOL did not work
with the screen-reader software necessary to translate computer
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise
or recreation.
Id.
202. RUTH COLKER & BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK: STATUTES AND REGULATORY GUIDANCE 372 (3d ed. 2000).
203. See Bick, supra note 2, at 208.
204. Id. at 214.
205. Id.
206. See Steven Mendelsohn & Martin Gould, When the Americans with Disabilities
Act Goes Online: Application of the ADA to the Internet and the World Wide Web, 7 COMP.
L. REV. & TECH. J. 173, 192 (2004) (citing Complaint, Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, Inc. v. Am. On-
Line, Inc., No. 99CV12303EFH (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 1999), in 1 AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 6:551 (1994 & Supp. 2000)); see also
Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA Applicability to the
Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 411 (2002).
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signals into Braille or synthesized speech. 20 7 The complaint also
alleged that AOL failed to remove communication barriers, which
prevented blind people from using the site in the same manner
enjoyed by sighted subscribers, in violation of Title III of the ADA.
208
The parties ultimately settled the case, and the complaint was
voluntarily dismissed.20 9 Without acknowledging any wrongdoing or
admitting that the ADA applied to its services, AOL agreed to
undertake "a number of voluntary measures," including establishing a
corporate policy regarding access and consulting with the disability
community about accessibility.
210
In Hooks v. OKbridge, Inc., rather than arguing that he could
not access a website, the plaintiff argued that he had been prevented
from using the online bridge tournament website because of his
disability.211  Specifically, Hooks argued that OKbridge had
terminated his membership because of his disability.212 The district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on several
grounds, including its finding that the website was not a place of
public accommodation. 21 3 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision, but did not publish its opinion.
214
The DOJ filed an amicus brief in the Hooks appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, arguing that the plain language of Title III referred to a place
"of' accommodation, not a place "at" or "in" an accommodation. The
latter interpretation would severely restrict the ADA's coverage. 21 5 In
a subsequent case, the DOJ pointed out:
[R]eading Title III to exclude the Internet, which neither existed nor was
considered by Congress when the ADA was enacted, would be analogous to holding
that freedom of speech and freedom of the press do not extend to electronic
communications over the Internet since such communications were not mentioned
in the First Amendment, or that the Fourth Amendment could not apply to the
privacy of telephone conversations because telephone wires do not come within the
207. See Mendolson & Gould, supra note 206, at 192.
208. Id. at 192-93 (citing Complaint, supra note 206)
209. Id. at 193
210. Id.
211. Brief of Appellant at *3, Hooks v. OKbridge, Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000)
(No. 99-50891), 2000 WL 34214842.
212. Id.
213. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Hooks,
232 F.3d 208 (No. 99-50891), 1999 WL 33806215.
214. See Hooks, 232 F.3d 208 (affirming district court without opinion).
215. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note
213, at I.A.1.
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ordinary meaning of the words "persons, papers and effects" used in the Fourth
Amendment.
2 1 6
By enacting the ADA, the DOJ argued, Congress intended to address
many areas in which people with disabilities experience
discrimination. 217 To interpret the ADA as only applying to the types
of discrimination that existed when the statute was enacted would be
short sighted. Such an interpretation would imply that Congress had
no intention of preventing discrimination against people with
disabilities in any situation other than those conceivable in 1990.
More than one circuit has refused to construe the scope of the
ADA so narrowly. In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., the First Circuit considered a
case in which the plaintiffs claimed disability discrimination in the
distribution of health insurance. 218 The First Circuit disagreed with
the district court's interpretation of "public accommodation" as "being
limited to actual physical structures with definite physical boundaries
which a person physically enters for the purpose of utilizing the
facilities or obtaining services therein."219 Looking at the language of
the statute, including the illustrative examples of different types of
public accommodations, the circuit court concluded that the "plain
meaning of the terms do not require 'public accommodations' to have
physical structures for persons to enter .... [The phrase's potential]
ambiguity, considered together with agency regulations and public
policy concerns, persuades us that the phrase is not limited to actual
physical structures."220 By listing "travel service" as an example of a
service that Congress considered a public accommodation, the circuit
court concluded that Congress intended to include service providers
where customers do not have to enter a physical structure.
221
The circuit court noted that a travel service can conduct
business, whether by telephone or by mail, without ever requiring its
customers to enter its physical place of business.222 "It would be
irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase
services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the
same services over the telephone or mail are not. Congress could not
216. See Mendelsohn & Gould, supra note 206, at 194 (citing Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 213).
217. See id. (citing Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant, supra note 213).
218. 37 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1994).
219. Id. at 18.
220. Id. at 19.
221. Id. at 19-20.
222. Id. at 19.
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have intended such an absurd result."223 Noting the absence of any
mention of physical boundaries or physical entry in either Title III
itself or the implementing regulations, the circuit court pointed out:
Many goods and services are sold over the telephone or by mail with customers
never physically entering the premises of a commercial entity to purchase the
goods or services. To exclude this broad category of businesses from the reach of
Title III and limit the application of Title III to physical structures which persons
must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA
and would severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities
fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available
indiscriminately to other members of the general public.
224
In this case, the court focused on how the ADA would be applied
inconsistently depending on whether or not a customer obtained a
good or service in person or by some other method.225  Such
inconsistency would be in direct conflict with the ADA's express
purpose of making goods and services as accessible to people with
disabilities as they are to any other member of the public. 226
In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit
also considered whether health insurance policies, which capped
coverage for AIDS and AIDS-related complications, violated Title III
of the ADA. 227 In dicta, the court cited Carparts Distribution Center,
Inc., and noted that the plain meaning of Title III
is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel
agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic
space) that is open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the
facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled
do.
2 2 8
Clearly, the court considered it both reasonable and logical to conclude
that Title III should apply to all places of public accommodation, not
just those that have a physical space.
In Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions Ltd., plaintiffs with
hearing and mobility impairments filed a class action suit alleging
that the telephone selection process for the game show Who Wants to
Be a Millionaire tended to screen out people with certain types of
disabilities by not using easily available technology, such as a TDD, in
violation of the ADA. 229 The district court granted the defendants'
223. Id.
224. Id. at 20.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999).
228. Id. at 559 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19) (emphasis
added).
229. 294 F.3d 1279, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2002).
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motion to dismiss, holding that Title III of the ADA did not apply
because the screening process did not occur at a "palpable public
accommodation. ' 230 The Eleventh Circuit overturned the lower court's
decision, concluding that the plaintiffs had stated a valid Title III
claim.231 The Eleventh Circuit found nothing in the text of the ADA
requiring that discriminatory screening or eligibility requirements
take place on-site in order to violate the ADA.232 "[O]ff-site screening
appears to be the paradigmatic example contemplated in [Title III]'s
prohibition .... There would be little question that it would violate
the ADA for the Defendants to screen potential contestants just
outside the studio by refusing otherwise qualified persons because
they were deaf or suffered from diabetes or HIV."233 The Eleventh
Circuit did reference those circuits that reached contrary conclusions
regarding the meaning of a public accommodation (e.g., requiring a
physical place of accommodation). 234 However, the court stated that,
at most, those decisions required a nexus between the challenged off-
site services or procedures and the public accommodation's physical
premises.235 So long as a plaintiff can show that a nexus exists, they
potentially can also show a Title III violation in the Eleventh Circuit.
In Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., the Second Circuit
considered whether a married couple, where both husband and wife
suffered from mental disabilities, had been discriminated against
when the defendant-insurance company refused to grant them life
insurance policies.23 6 The Second Circuit found that Title III does
regulate insurance underwriting practices, to some extent, and held
that "Title III's mandate that the disabled be accorded 'full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any place of public
accommodation,' suggests to us that the statute was meant to
guarantee them more than mere physical access."
237
Still being considered by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California is National Federation of the Blind v.
Target Corp., the most recent case to address the applicability of Title
230. Id. at 1281.
231. Id. at 1280.
232. Id. at 1283-84.
233. Id. at 1285 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 29 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000)).
234. Id. at 1284 n.8 (citing Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d
1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir.
1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011-14 (6th Cir. 1997)).
235. Id.
236. 198 F.3d 28, 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1999), amended by,204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000).
237. Id. at 32 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act Title III, 29 U.S.C. §
12182(a)) (alteration in original).
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III to the Internet. 23 8 A blind customer, along with the National
Federation of the Blind, brought a class action suit against the retail
store Target, alleging that Target's website was inaccessible to blind
consumers in violation of the ADA and state law prohibiting
discrimination against people with disabilities. 239 In a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, Target argued that
the ADA and state law only cover access to physical spaces.
240
Therefore, Target asserted, the complaint did not state a claim
because plaintiffs alleged discrimination in access to Target.com,
which is not a physical space, as opposed to brick and mortar Target
stores. 241 Plaintiffs had stated in their complaint that, by denying
them access to Target.com, Target was denying them access to all the
goods and services offered by Target stores, which no one can dispute
are places of public accommodations.
242
Methodically reviewing the relevant case law from multiple
circuits, the district court disagreed with Target's argument that the
discrimination must occur at the place of public accommodation. 243
Noting the language of the statute itself (services of a public
accommodation, not services in a public accommodation), the court
stated: "To limit the ADA to discrimination in the provision of services
occurring on the premises of a public accommodation would contradict
the plain language of [Title III]. ' '244 Target also did not persuade the
court to accept its argument that the nexus theory only applies when
individuals are denied physical access to places of public
accommodation. 245 Pointing out that "no court has held that under the
nexus theory a plaintiff has a cognizable claim only if the challenged
service prevents physical access to a public accommodation," the court
also noted that "it is clear that the purpose of the statute is broader
than mere physical access-seeking to bar actions or omissions which
238. See 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
239. Id. at 949.
240. Id. at 950; Defendant Target Corp.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion to Strike, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452
F. Supp. 2d 946 (No. C 06-01802 MHP), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 13253, at *21-
22 [hereinafter Defendant's Motion to Dismiss].
241. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 950-52; Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 240, at *21-28.
242. Id. at 952; see Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Target Corp.'s Motion to
Dismiss, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (No. C 06-01802 MHP), 2006 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 13083, at *40-43, *42 n.9 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition].
243. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 952-53.
244. Id. at 953 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a) (2000)).
245. Id. at 953-55.
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impair a disabled person's 'full enjoyment' of services or goods of a
covered accommodation."
246
The court found unconvincing Target's attempt to distinguish
between services that interfere with an individual's access to a
physical place of public accommodation and those services that the
facility offers. 247 Accepting this interpretation, the court noted, "would
effectively limit the scope of Title III to the provision of ramps,
elevators and other aids that operate to remove physical barriers to
entry."248 The court denied Target's motion to dismiss the portion of
the plaintiffs' claim arguing that the inaccessibility of Target.com
constituted a denial of full and equal enjoyment of services offered at
Target stores. 249 It did, however, dismiss the portion of the plaintiffs'
claim that addressed aspects of Target.com not connected to Target
stores.250
In a footnote, the court suggested that it might be willing to
change its opinion of what might be covered under the ADA after
reviewing the website in question, particularly given that Target
treats the website as an extension of the store. 251 The court indicated
that, if further evidence showed that the store and the website are
part of an integrated merchandising effort by Target, a broader
application of the ADA (other than only to physical places of public
accommodation) to the website might be appropriate.
252
D. Arguments Against Title III of the ADA Applying to the Internet
As discussed, the primary arguments against applying Title III
to the Internet generally focus on either the plain meaning of the
statute itself, or a lack of nexus between the provided service and a
246. Id. at 953-54 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act Title III, 29 U.S.C. §
12182(a)).
247. Id. at 954-55.
248. Id. at 955.
249. Id. at 956.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 956 n.4.
252. Id. In a separate motion for class certification, the court amended the wording
of the class definition of the nationwide class to be consistent with its previously stated
nexus requirement between the use of Target.com and the Target stores. See Nat'l Fed'n of
the Blind v. Target Corp., No. C 06-01802 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30513, at *11-12
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007). Unmoved by the declarations submitted by the potential
members of the class, the court also indicated that in order to succeed as a class action, the
plaintiffs would have to submit more compelling declarations regarding use of the website
to access the stores. Id. at *15-16. On October 2, 2007, the district court did grant the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., No. C 06-
1802 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73547 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007).
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physical place of public accommodation. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits did not agree with the First Circuit's analysis in Carparts
Distribution Center, Inc. regarding what should constitute a place of
public accommodation and, thus, be covered by Title III of the ADA.
In three different cases all involving insurance companies, those
circuits denied the plaintiffs' claims for relief. In Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff claimed disability
discrimination when her employer offered a different long-term
disability insurance to cover mental disabilities than the policy offered
for other disabilities. 253 The Sixth Circuit held that an insurance
company that issued a policy for an employer was not a place of public
accommodation, and therefore, the plaintiff could not sue the company
for violating Title III when the dispute was with the employer. 25 4 The
Sixth Circuit based its decision on the lack of nexus "between the
disparity in benefits and the services that [the insurance company]
offers to the public from its insurance office."
255
Similarly, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit
examined the plain meaning of Title III and determined that a public
accommodation is, by definition, a physical place. 256 In Ford, the
plaintiff claimed that she was discriminated against based on her
disability because her employer capped benefits for employees with
mental disabilities at two years, where no such cap existed for
employees with physical disabilities. 257 However, since the plaintiff
"received her disability benefits via her employment at Schering, she
had no nexus to [the insurance company's] 'insurance office' and thus
was not discriminated against in connection with a public
accommodation." 258 In Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the Third and Sixth
Circuits and found that the physical places listed as public
accommodations in Title III suggested that "some connection between
the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is
required." 25
9
253. 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997).
254. Id. at 1010.
255. Id. at 1011 (citing Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580,
582 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the terms "place of public
accommodation" and "facility" as applicable to physical places, and finding that the service
that the plaintiffs complained of-a live telecast of a football game-was not being offered
by a public accommodation-the football stadium)).
256. 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998).
257. Id. at 603.
258. Id. at 612-13.
259. 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
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In the first case in which a court ruled on whether the ADA
applies to the Internet, Access Now, a non-profit, access advocacy
organization for people with disabilities, along with a blind individual,
filed a four-count complaint against Southwest Airlines
(Southwest).260  The complaint alleged that Southwest's website,
southwest.com, violated Title III of the ADA by making goods and
services that Southwest offers at virtual ticket counters inaccessible to
people who are blind.261  Plaintiffs based their allegation of
discrimination on southwest.com's failure to accomodate access to
customers who use a screen reader, thus preventing those customers
from making travel arrangements online.262 In granting Southwest's
motion to dismiss, the court found that the airline's website was not a
place of public accommodation because the "plain and unambiguous
language" of the ADA and regulations did not specifically include
Internet websites.263  Because Congress "created specifically
enumerated rights" and intended to set forth 'clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards,"' the court determined that, until
Congress revised the standards that applied to those rights, it would
have to follow the law as written.264 The court stated that, "to fall
within the scope of the ADA as presently drafted, a public
accommodation must be a physical, concrete structure. To expand the
ADA to cover 'virtual' spaces would be to create new rights without
well-defined standards."265  Ultimately, the court concluded that
failing to establish a nexus between Southwest's website and a
physical place of public accommodation caused the plaintiffs to fail to
state a claim under Title III of the ADA upon which relief could be
granted.266
It can be argued that the text of the ADA does not support an
extension of accessibility requirements to the Internet because it does
not include websites within Title III's definition of "places of public
accommodation." Two canons of statutory interpretation dictate that
"places of public accommodation" refers exclusively to physical
260. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S.D. Fla.
2002).
261. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Southwest's website violated the
communication barriers removal provision of the ADA, the auxiliary aids and services
provision of the ADA, the reasonable modifications provisions of the ADA, and the full and
equal enjoyment and participation provisions of the ADA. Id. at 1316.
262. Id. at 1316.
263. Id. at 1317-18.
264. Id. at 1318.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1321.
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facilities: noscitur a sociis-a term should be interpreted within the
context of the accompanying words, or the term is known by its
associates-and ejusdem generis-when general words follow an
enumeration of specific words, the general words are to be read as
applying only to the same general kind of class as those
enumerated. 2 7 Nowhere in the ADA's statement of purpose is the
Internetor any other intangible place of public accommodation
mentioned.
One of the primary purposes of the ADA was to end the
segregation and unequal treatment experienced by people with
disabilities. 268 Historically separated from mainstream society by both
physical barriers and direct discriminatory actions, the ADA provided
legal recourse to people with disabilities to address these pervasive
problems. 269 However, the Internet was not a part of mainstream life
in 1990. The absence of the Internet from the original debate over the
ADA "raises serious issues of statutory interpretation"270 and calls into
question the appropriateness of applying the ADA to the Internet.
The statement of purpose in the text itself states the ADA is intended
"to invoke the sweep of congressional authority.., in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities." 271 Read as a whole, "the entire statute implements the
statement of purpose concerning public accommodations in purely
physical terms. Thus, the purpose should be read to extend
'comprehensively' to 'major areas' of discrimination found in physical
facilities or public accommodations." 272 The expansive ideas included
in the ADA's legislative history support not applying the ADA to the
Internet. "The ADA's purpose is to address a broad range of
situations-but every situation in that broad range envisions a
physical facility or place of public accommodation." 273
267. Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job: Are Commercial Websites
Places of Public Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?, 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 191, 196-98 (2000). See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), where the court interpreted the principle of
noscitur a sociis as requiring some connection, or nexus between the physical place and the
good or service being offered. See also Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318-19
(discussing ejusdem generis).
268. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) & (7)
(2000).
269. See id. § 12101.
270. Maroney, supra note 267, at 199.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
272. Maroney, supra note 267, at 200-01.
273. Id. at 201.
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The legislature only listed physical structures as examples of
places of public accommodation, and failed to list non-physical
establishments in existence at the time. By not listing "then existing,
non-physical establishments that offer goods and services to the
public," such as over-the-phone operations or mail order businesses,
the legislature indicated that "entities not offering their services
through physical structures were not contemplated as coming under
the purview of Title III."274
Different courts' interpretations of the applicability of the ADA
to the Internet have resulted in inconsistent standards. If Congress
actually intended to include the Internet as a public accommodation
under the ADA, it should revise the current requirements
categorically to include the Internet as a public accommodation.
Congress has already, through section 508, required that all federal
websites be accessible to people with disabilities. 275 However, even if
Congress does legislate that the Internet is a public accommodation,
the amount of time and money that would be required to force each
and every private website to comply would, most likely, be prohibitive.
A more efficient and cost-effective solution would be to develop a
program that shows how many people with disabilities use the
Internet and how much more money could be made by websites if
those websites were accessible to them.276 For websites that are not
sustained by moneymaking concerns, a government subsidy could
offset the cost of compliance and encourage more websites to become
accessible. 2
77
274. Konkright, supra note 200, at 723 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000)).
275. See Emily Short, E-Commerce and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Failing
to Extend the ADA to the Internet in Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, 1 OKLA. J.L. &
TECH. 6, at III.C (2003).
276. Who would develop such a program is an open question. Disability rights
advocates would likely be motivated to do so. Marketing consultants or researchers might
be interested in doing the same thing strictly for economic reasons-an accessible website
could be shown to be more profitable than an inaccessible one.
277. See Adam M. Schloss, Web-Sight for Visually-Disabled People: Does Title III of
the Americans With Disabilities Act Apply to Internet Websites?, 35 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 35, 56-57 (2001).
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IV. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION MUST PROVIDE REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES TO ACCESS THE
INTERNET
A. Students with Disabilities are Covered by the ADA and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, Thereby Obligating Institutions of Higher
Education to Provide Them with Reasonable Accommodations to
Access the Internet
Unlike the differences of opinion that surround applying the
ADA to the Internet, the law is perfectly clear when addressing the
obligations of public and private colleges and universities: they are
prohibited from excluding students with disabilities from participating
in programs and services they provide.278 Once students clear the
hurdle of proving that they do have a disability, colleges and
universities have the obligation to provide the students with
reasonable accommodations. 279  This assumes that the
accommodations do not fundamentally alter the educational program
or service being provided to the students. 280 So, the question remains:
Exactly what is the obligation of institutions of higher education to
ensure that students with disabilities have access to the Internet?
The OCR provides guidance for students with disabilities and
academic institutions regarding easing the transition from secondary
to post-secondary education. 281 Colleges may have to make academic
adjustments to accommodate students with disabilities, such as a
reduced course load, extra time on examinations, and the provision of
auxiliary aids and services. 28 2 Auxiliary aids and services include sign
language interpreters, note-takers, "voice recognition and other
adaptive software or hardware for computers, and other devices
designed to ensure the participation of students with impaired
sensory, manual or speaking skills in an institution's programs and
activities."28 3 The OCR also lists the basic components of effective
communication, which apply in every college course. They include
"timeliness of delivery, accuracy of the translation, and provision in a
278. See supra Part I.A.-.B.
279. See supra Part I.C.
280. See supra Part I.D.1.
281. See U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Transition of
Students with Disabilities to Postsecondary Education: A Guide for High School Educators
(Mar. 2007), http://www.ed.gov/about/officeslist/ocr/transitionguide.html.
282. See id.
283. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2006)).
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manner and medium appropriate to the significance of the message
and the abilities of the individual with the disability. '28 4 These basic
components are designed to ensure that students with disabilities
receive the same information, and ultimately the same education, as
non-disabled students.
28 5
In addition to communication in general, the OCR stresses the
importance of having students become familiar with computers prior
to graduating high school. Acknowledging the primary role computers
play in college life, the OCR noted that "it is essential that students
learn to use computers if they are to be prepared for postsecondary
education." 28 6  When applying the effective communication test to
college library resources, as well as the Internet, when applicable, the
OCR stated:
When looking at exactly which of its resources a library is obligated to provide in
an accessible medium, the short answer is any resources the library makes
available to nondisabled patrons must be made accessible to blind patrons. This
includes the library catalogue, the archived microfiche, daily newspapers, and the
Internet (if that is a service provided to sighted patrons).
2 87
Addressing the specific needs of students with disabilities in
the context of library study, the OCR mandates that "[a]rticles and
materials that are library holdings and are required for course work
must be accessible to all students enrolled in that course." 288 It follows
logically that if library holdings that are required for course work
must be accessible, so must be websites that are necessary for
students to perform required class assignments. However,
complications arise when auxiliary aids provided by the college cannot
make the website accessible.
Websites with new technology are often incompatible with
screen readers or other adaptive software or hardware. This occurs
because assistive technology tends to be reactive by design, and
therefore frequently one step behind the technology being used
284. See Paul G. Grossman & Laurie Vasquez, Technology and the Law,
Collaborating for Success, http://www.colorado.edulATconference/5%20page%20abstract
%20-%20vasquez.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007) (citation omitted).
285. See id.
286. Office of Civil Rights, Transition of Students With Disabilities To
Postsecondary Education: A Guide for High School Educators (March 2007),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/transitionguide.html.
287. Letter from Adriana Cardenas, Team Leader, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for
Civil Rights, to Dr. James Rosser, President, Cal. State Univ., L.A. (Apr. 7, 1997), available
at http://www.rit.edu/-easi/law/csula.htm (emphasis added).
288. United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Auxiliary Aids
and Services for Postsecondary Students with Disabilities: Higher Education's Obligations
Under Section 504 and Title 11 of the ADA (rev. Sept. 1998),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/listlocr/docs/auxaids.html.
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online.28 9 Websites with streaming audio may not be captioned. With
the courts unable to agree on when a website must be accessible,
students with disabilities would not likely succeed in compelling every
website they need to use for a course to comply with the ADA by
challenging each one in court. That leaves it for the college or
university to ensure that the students have access to the necessary
websites. This could be easily accomplished, for example, by having
someone describe a website to a blind student or having a sign
language interpreter interpret uncaptioned video. If utilizing a
different website would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
course, the instructor could simply assign an alternate website that
could be made accessible, either by assistive technology or by some
other means. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the institution of
higher learning to ensure that students with disabilities have the
same access to websites as their peers.
B. The California State University Accessible Technology Initiative
One institution of higher learning has already begun the
process of ensuring that students with and without disabilities have
equal access to all of its programs and services, including information
technology resources. In 2004, the Chancellor of the California State
University system (CSU), the largest university system in the country
with 23 different campuses and nearly 450,000 students,290 issued
Executive Order 926 (EO 926).291 Effective January 1, 2005, EO 926
affirmed that, in accordance with state and federal law, "[t]he policy of
the CSU is to make its programs, services, and activities accessible to
students, faculty, staff, and the general public who visit or attend a
campus-sponsored event, with disabilities."292 Additionally, EO 926
explicitly stated that "[i]t is the policy of ... CSU to make information
technology resources and services accessible to all CSU students,
faculty, staff, and the general public regardless of disability."293 Items
such as a professor's webpage and websites used for class assignments
289. See Kerry Dobransky & Eszter Hargittai, The Disability Divide in Internet
Access and Use, 9 INFO., COMM. & SOC'Y 318 (2006) available at http://www.eszter.coml
research/pubs/dobransky-hargittai-disabilitydivide.pdf.
290. California State University, http://calstate.edu (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
291. See Memorandum from Charles B. Reed, Chancellor, Cal. State Univ., to Cal.
State Univ. Presidents, on California State University Board of Trustees Policy on
Disability Support and Accommodations-Executive Order No. 926 (Dec. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.calstate.edu/eo/EO-926.pdf.
292. Id. at 2.
293. Id. at 4.
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are included in the mandate to make information technology resources
and services accessible to everyone.
In order to carry out EO 926 effectively, the CSU system
embarked on a multi-phase Accessible Technology Initiative (ATI) to
bring all CSU campuses into compliance with section 508.294 The
office of the CSU Chancellor issued a memorandum on "Access to
Electronic and Information Technology for Persons with Disabilities,"
setting web accessibility as the top priority. 295 Stating that "[cireating
and maintaining accessible websites will be an ongoing institutional
responsibility," the memorandum set forth an eleven step, non-
inclusive implementation plan.296 The steps to implement the plan
include developing a process for auditing, monitoring, and remediation
of websites, and developing a strategy to ensure that new websites
and web content incorporate accessibility in the design and authoring
process. 297 Other priorities in the memorandum include making
instructional materials accessible and ensuring the accessibility of any
electronic and information technology procured by CSU.298
Complementary to the ATI is the annual Technology and
Persons with Disabilities Conference, developed at California State
University, Northridge (CSUN). The Center on Disabilities at CSUN
serves more than 750 students with disabilities, offering
accommodations ranging from providing a note-taker in class to
converting textbooks from print to Braille. Stemming from the
center's outreach efforts, the conference highlights assistive
technology and how it can mitigate the barriers faced by people with
disabilities. Now in its twenty-second year, the most recently held
conference hosted 4,500 attendees from around the world.299 As more
students, educators, and administrators become aware of and involved
in such conferences, colleges and universities can learn to better serve
their students with disabilities.
CSU exemplifies how institutions of higher learning can work
towards making information technology resources accessible to all
students, and CSUN's technology conference offers a wide variety of
294. See Memorandum from Gary W. Reichard, Executive Vice Chancellor, Cal.
State Univ. to Cal. State Univ. Presidents, on Access to Electronic and Information
Technology for Persons with Disabilities (Feb. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.calstate.edu/AcadAff/ codedmemos/AA-2007-04.pdf.
295. Id. at 2.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 3-5.
299. AScribe.org, California State University, Northridge Center Changing the World
for People with Disabilities (Apr. 3, 2007), http://newswire.ascribe.org/cgi-
bin/behold.pl?ascribeid=20070403.142000&time= 15%2005%20PDT&year=2007&public=O/.
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ways in which colleges and universities can reasonably accommodate
students with disabilities without undue burden. The ATI
demonstrates how a system-wide change can be implemented to
address the accessibility needs of students. It also illustrates how
universities can comply with section 508 and the ADA, meeting both
accessibility and non-discrimination requirements, without
fundamentally altering existing programs. CSU sets an example for
other institutions of higher learning of how to respond to the
intersection of technology, higher education, and anti-discrimination
laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and III of the
ADA prohibit colleges and universities from discriminating against
individuals with disabilities. Institutions of higher education must
make their programs and services accessible to students with
disabilities, so long as by doing so they would not fundamentally alter
the program or service provided or cause the institution to be unduly
burdened. Once students have been identified as having a disability,
the college or university must provide them with reasonable
accommodations.
Although section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended in
1998, does not directly apply to private Internet sites, states that have
adopted section 508-type statutes must comply with its requirements.
Additionally, several factors indicate a connection between the ADA
and section 508. The use of ADA terminology and the importance
placed by the federal government on ensuring that federal websites
are accessible to people with disabilities follows the ADA's general
purpose of eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities.
Section 508 could be used as a guide if the courts ultimately determine
that the ADA does apply to the Internet.
In general, private universities have no section 508 compliance
requirement. Conceivably, however, if a state gives money to a
private university, the state could make section 508 compliance a
condition of receiving the funds. Section 508 does apply to state
institutions of higher learning in those states with section 508-type
statutes, requiring them to make their websites accessible if it is
readily achievable to do so and would not constitute an undue burden.
CSU's ATI and CSUN's technology conference demonstrate how a
system-wide change can be undertaken to comply with section 508
without imposing an undue burden.
ACCESS THIS
Courts have failed to reach consistent conclusions regarding
the applicability of the ADA to the Internet. They continue to
disagree over what constitutes a "place" of public accommodation, and
whether or not a nexus must exist between an Internet website and a
physical public accommodation. To some extent, courts have erected
their own barriers to entry, preventing people with disabilities from
fully accessing the Internet.
Yet, where the Internet and disability law's applicability to
institutions of higher education intersect, the result should be clear:
colleges and universities have an undeniable legal obligation to make
their programs and services accessible to students with disabilities.
In order to do so, they must make Internet sites that are available
through the library, through course instruction, or directly from the
institution itself accessible to all students. Just as institutions of
higher learning were at the cutting edge of finding ways to use the
Internet at the end of the last century, so too should they be at the
cutting edge of making the Internet accessible to everyone.
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